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ABSTRACT
We demonstrate the experimental feasibility of a Trojan-horse attack that remains nearly invisible to the single-
photon detectors employed in practical quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, such as Clavis2 from ID Quantique.
We perform a detailed numerical comparison of the attack performance against Scarani-Acı´n-Ribordy-Gisin
(SARG04) QKD protocol at 1924 nm versus that at 1536 nm. The attack strategy was proposed earlier but found to
be unsuccessful at the latter wavelength, as reported in N. Jain et al., New J. Phys. 16, 123030 (2014). However
at 1924 nm, we show experimentally that the noise response of the detectors to bright pulses is greatly reduced,
and show by modeling that the same attack will succeed. The invisible nature of the attack poses a threat to the
security of practical QKD if proper countermeasures are not adopted.
Executive summary
A previous study in 2014 proposed a Trojan-horse attack against Clavis2 receiver (Bob) module; however the attack
fell short of the performance level needed to breach the system security – by a large margin of roughly 100 times.
Our present study shows that if an attacker resorts to using a longer wavelength (> 1900 nm) not ordinarily used in
telecommunication, the same attack may breach the security. Although a complete eavesdropping apparatus is still
quite challenging to build, it might be possible with today’s or near-future technology. To prevent this, we have
recommended the manufacturer to install a wavelength filter, which is a simple fiber-optic component that can be
added just outside the installed system without having to recall it to the factory. For customers using ID Quantique’s
QKD products for critical data protection, we recommend that they inquire the manufacturer about this upgrade at
the next convenient opportunity, such as a scheduled on-site maintenance. Not every installed system requires this
upgrade: some systems are using protocols not vulnerable to this attack, and some may already have the wavelength
filter included as part of network configuration. Since QKD cannot be attacked retroactively, security of customers’
historical network transmissions is not affected by this study.
Introduction
Quantum cryptography allows two parties, Alice and Bob, to obtain random but correlated sequences of bits by
exchanging quantum states1–3. The bit sequences can then be classically processed to get shorter but secret keys. The
security of the key relies on the fact that an adversary Eve cannot eavesdrop on the exchange without introducing
errors noticeable to Alice and Bob. This constitutes a solution to the problem of key distribution in cryptography,
and is better known as quantum key distribution (QKD).
The security of keys distributed over the ‘quantum channel’ connecting Alice and Bob can be validated by a
theoretical security proof. If the amount of errors observed by the two parties exceed a certain threshold, they abort
the QKD protocol. Conversely, if the incurred quantum bit error rate (QBER) is below the abort threshold Qabort, the
protocol guarantees that Eve cannot know the secret key, except with a vanishingly small probability3.
However, due to discrepancies between theory and practice, the operation of the QKD protocol may be
manipulated by Eve in order to gain information about the key without introducing too many errors. Such
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Figure 1. Basic experimental schematic and attack paths at λs = 1536 nm and λl = 1924 nm. The scheme and
operation of Bob’s setup is described in detail in refs. 13, 17. The stars indicate the back-reflection sources exploited
in ref. 11 and in this work. Trojan laser models: Eblana Photonics EP1925-DM-B06-FA at λl and Alcatel 1905 LMI
at λs. OI, optical isolator; PC, polarization controller; PBS, polarizing beamsplitter; BS, 50:50 beamsplitter; C,
circulator; D, single-photon detectors; X, Y, Z, bulkhead fiber-optic connectors.
discrepancies can arise due to imperfections in the physical devices used in the implementation and/or incorrect
assumptions in the theoretical security proofs3–5. The field of ‘quantum hacking’ investigates practical QKD
implementations to find such theory-practice deviations, demonstrate the resultant vulnerability via proof-of-principle
attacks, and propose countermeasures to protect Alice and Bob from Eve. Over the years, many vulnerabilities
have been discovered and attacks have been proposed and demonstrated on both commercial and laboratory QKD
systems; see refs. 6–8 for reviews. In most cases, it was shown that under attack conditions, the QBER Q≤ Qabort
but Eve’s knowledge of the secret key was substantially larger than the predictions of the security proof.
In the so-called Trojan-horse attack9 (introduced as a ‘large pulse attack’ a few years before10), Eve probes the
properties of a component inside Alice or Bob by sending in a bright pulse and analyzing a suitable back-reflected
pulse. This attack was recently demonstrated11 with the intention to breach the security of the Scarani-Acı´n-Ribordy-
Gisin QKD protocol (SARG04)12 running on the commercial QKD system Clavis2 from ID Quantique13. SARG04
is a four-state protocol that is equivalent to the Bennett-Brassard QKD protocol (BB84)1 in the quantum stage. Their
difference comes in the classical processing stage: in SARG04, the bases selections of Bob are used for coding
the secret bits, unlike in BB84 where they are publicly revealed. Therefore, if Eve surreptitiously gets information
about Bob’s bases selections at any time, she can compromise the security of the QKD system running SARG04. (In
contrast, a Trojan-horse attack on Bob running the BB84 protocol is normally useless10, unless it is combined with
other attacks14–16.)
In the attack demonstration11, it was shown that getting the bases’ information in a remote manner was indeed
possible via homodyne measurement of the back-reflected photons. The path taken by these photons at 1550 nm, as
depicted by the green dotted line in Fig. 1, traverses Bob’s phase modulator (PM) twice. The homodyne measurement
thus allowed discerning the phase applied by Bob, which is equivalent to knowing his basis selection. This ‘phase
readout’ was accurate in > 90% cases even when the mean photon number of the back-reflected pulses was ≈ 3.
Despite that, an overall attack on the QKD system did not have a chance to succeed owing to a side effect
produced when the bright pulses went on to hit the detectors D0 and D1, as may be visualized in Fig. 1. To elaborate,
the bright pulses result in a severe afterpulsing in these InGaAs/InP single-photon detectors (SPDs), which are
operated in a gated mode. For a single bright pulse that hits D1, even if well outside a gate, the cumulative probability
of a spurious detection event due to afterpulsing crosses 40% (which is ∼ 4 times the detection probability of a
single photon) in just 5 gate periods18. The resulting detection events (clicks) are accidental, i.e., erroneous in half
of the cases. Hence, only a handful of Trojan-horse pulses (THPs) suffice to rapidly elevate the number of erroneous
clicks and make the QBER surpass Qabort, even though Eve’s actual knowledge IactE of the key is still quite small.
An elaborate attack strategy to improve IactE was proposed and numerically simulated, however, it could also not
simultaneously satisfy Q≤ Qabort together with IactE > IestE , where IestE is the estimated (theoretical) security bound on
Eve’s knowledge that Clavis2 uses to produce the final secret key11. While ref. 11 did not prove that a better attack
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Table 1. Comparison of optical losses in Bob at λs versus λl . See Fig. 1 for location of the paths and points. The
loss during reflection ΓZ? was measured at 1550 nm11, which we consider to be close enough to our λs = 1536 nm.
Paths & points Loss at λs (dB) Loss at λl (dB)
X–Y 0.9 3.6
Y–Z 2.6 23.0
Z? 51.7
Z–C?–X 58.4 to 65.8
(polarization-dependent)
X–D0 8.8 (via long arm) 15.5 (via short arm)
X–C–D1 9.2 (via long arm) 25.8 (via short arm)
could not be constructed, the attack proposed failed in practice by a large margin.
In this Article, we provide experimental evidence that this Trojan-horse attack could however succeed if Eve
were to craft bright pulses at a wavelength where the afterpulsing experienced by the SPDs is considerably lower. The
underlying physics is that photons with energy lower than the bandgap of the SPD absorption layer material (InGaAs)
mostly pass the material unabsorbed, thereby causing negligible afterpulsing. Indeed, we confirm experimentally
that at a relatively longer wavelength λl = 1924 nm the SPD has much less afterpulsing than at λs = 1536 nm
(similar to the wavelength used in ref. 11). We then perform a numerical comparison of the attack conditions and
performance at λl with these at λs. By means of an optimized simulation that assumes fairly realistic conditions,
we show that the actual attack at λl can break the security of Clavis2. The attack in itself is general enough to
be potentially applicable to most discrete-variable QKD systems, and can be categorized with those that exploit
vulnerabilities arising from the wavelength-dependence of optical components19, 20.
Experiment
While using λl = 1924 nm for the attack offers the benefit of reduced afterpulsing, the transmittance and reflectance
properties of different optical components inside Bob vary greatly in comparison with those measured at λs =
1536 nm. Most relevant to the attack, the attenuation is generally higher; for instance, the optical loss through the
PM at λl is & 20 dB higher than that at λs. Furthermore, the modulation itself varies with λ since the modulator’s
half-wave voltage is a function of wavelength. If Eve uses light at λl to estimate Bob’s randomly modulated phase
(ϕB = 0 or pi/2 at λs) through the homodyne measurement of a pulse that made a single pass through the PM, the
measurement outcomes will not be on orthogonal quadratures.
Altogether, it is thus likely that compared to ref. 11, Eve would not only need to inject a larger mean photon
number µE→B into Bob, but may also require a higher mean photon number µB→E in the back-reflection for successful
homodyne measurements. To calculate the efficacy of the attack, we experimentally quantify at λl (relative to λs) the
following three aspects: increased attenuation, altered phase modulation, and decreased afterpulsing. Figure 1 shows
a schematic of the experimental setup used for various measurements.
Increased attenuation
To gauge the increase in attenuation, we measured the optical loss of various components of Bob at both λs and
λl . In Fig. 1, the dotted line (path X–Y–Z?–Y–X, where ? indicates the source of reflection) shows the attack
path used in ref. 11. Relevant loss values are given in the left column of Table 1. With a round trip loss of
LX–Y–Z?–Y–X(λs) = 2 LX–Y(λs)+ΓZ? + 2 LY–Z(λs) = 58.7 dB, Trojan-horse pulses injected with µE→B ≈ 2× 106
photons yielded µB→E ≈ 4 photons in the back-reflection from Bob. Here, ΓZ? = 51.7 dB is the loss during reflection
at Z, the fiber connector after Bob’s PM.
For an attack at λl with Trojan-horse pulses traversing the same path, the round trip loss would be LX–Y–Z?–Y–X(λl)=
104.9 dB (with the further assumption that ΓZ? is independent of wavelength). The attack pulses at λl would therefore
face 46.2 dB more attenuation than at λs. A major contribution to this large attenuation is from the PM, which even
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gets doubled since the THPs travel through the PM twice.
However, since a single pass can also yield information about ϕB, Eve can opt for a different route where only
either the input forward-traveling THP or the back-reflected pulse passes through Bob’s PM. All Eve requires is a
reasonably large source of reflection from any component after the 50:50 beamsplitter (BS). Indeed, during our
loss measurements at λl we observed a large attenuation through the optical circulator (C), a part of which stems
from a rather generous back-reflection. We estimated the loss LZ–C?–X(λl) for the path Z–C?–X (via BS twice and
polarizing beamsplitter once) using a photon-counting method, described below.
We temporarily connected the polarization-controlled output of the 1924 nm laser at Z to send light towards the
BS. The average power of the pulsed laser, operated at 5 MHz repetition rate, was Pavg = 21.55 µW, corresponding
to a mean photon number per pulse µZ = 4.14×107. An SPD was connected at X to detect the back-reflections
from C. To prevent other back-reflections from contributing to the photon counts, Bob’s laser and detectors D0 and
D1 were disconnected, and the patchcords (with open connectors) were coiled on a pencil to strongly attenuate the
propagating light.
Two counters (Stanford Research Systems SR620) were used to measure the number of optical pulses sent by the
laser N = 4.98×106 and the number of pulses received by the detector n= 323 maximized over input polarization
at Z. The mean photon number per pulse at X was estimated as µX ≈ 59.7 from the relation,
n−d
N
= 1− e−µXηd ≈ µX ηD, (1)
where d = 60 is the number of dark counts and ηD = 8.85× 10−7 is the single-photon detection efficiency at
λl , which was estimated in a separate experiment similar to the one in ref. 20. The ratio of the mean photon
numbers µZ/µX provides the overall loss LZ–C?–X(λl) ≈ 58.4 dB. The dashed line in Fig. 1 shows the complete
attack path. Eve’s THPs from the quantum channel enter the long arm of Bob, pass through the modulator, and
after a reflection from the BS, propagate to the circulator. Here, they get back-reflected and then take the short
arm to exit Bob, passing through the BS again. Using Table 1, this path can be characterized by a total loss
LX–Y–Z–C?–X(λl) = LX–Y(λl)+LY–Z(λl)+LZ–C?–X(λl) = 85.0 dB.
As noted above, the value of µX was polarization-sensitive. For the worst input polarization, µX decreased by
7.4 dB, changing the overall loss to LX–Y–Z–C?–X(λl) = 92.4 dB. For the rest of the paper, we shall assume the attack
pulses to be in a polarization midway between the best and the worst, leading to a loss figure of LX–Y–Z–C?–X(λl) =
87.3 dB used to decide Eve’s photon budget. In terms of photon numbers, this implies that in order to get the same
number of photons out from Bob (i.e., µB→E ≈ 4), Eve needs to inject ρ = 10(−58.7+87.3)/10 = 7.24× 102 times
more photons at λl than at λs.
Altered phase modulator response
We now explain an impact of the altered phase modulation experienced by Eve’s THPs at λl as they travel through
Bob’s PM. As mentioned before, Bob randomly chooses between voltagesV0(= 0 V) orVpi/2 to apply a phase ϕB = 0
or pi/2 on Alice’s incoming quantum signal at (or in the vicinity of) λs = 1536 nm. Eve’s objective is to learn ϕB.
The double pass through the PM in ref. 11 implied that Eve had to discriminate between a pair of coherent states with
angle θ(λs)≡ θs = 2×pi/2 = pi between them, as illustrated in Fig. 2(a). At λl = 1924 nm, the phase modulator is
expected to lose efficiency and provide less phase shift at the same voltage. Furthermore, Eve’s THP only traverses
it once. Assuming a linear response of the PM, one can calculate the angle θl = [Vpi/2(λs)/Vpi/2(λl)]×pi/2 between
the coherent states available to Eve.
Since the half-wave voltage of the PM at 1924 nm was not specified by the manufacturer, we experimentally
measured it. We constructed a balanced fiber-optic Mach-Zehnder interferometer, incorporating the path X–Z (Fig. 1)
into one of its arms. We applied a square modulation voltage to the PM, and observed interference fringes at the
output port of the interferometer. We adjusted the voltage amplitude until it was causing no light modulation at the
output port, indicating an exact 2pi phase shift. From this, we found that Vpi/2(λl) = 5.7 V. By the same method
with the 1536 nm laser, we found Vpi/2(λs) = 3.35 V.
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Figure 2. Illustrative phase space representation of the back-reflected states. Eve attempts to discern ϕB = 0 or
pi/2 by performing optimal detection on the back-reflected weak coherent states |α〉 and |β 〉 that have a non-zero
overlap. (a) The complex amplitude β = αeiθs =−α , as a result of the double pass at the attack wavelength of λs.
(b) β = αeiθl , as a result of the single pass at λl through Bob’s modulator.
From this measurement, we calculated θl ≈ 0.294pi < θs. The increased overlap between the two states |α〉 and
|β 〉 with |α|= |β |, as depicted in Fig. 2(b), would make discrimination between Bob’s choices of ϕB more difficult.
Eve can however increase the brightness of the injected Trojan-horse pulse: this would elicit a higher mean photon
number in the back-reflection, effectively translating the states farther from the origin to diminish the overlap. The
increment factor that makes the distance between the states at λl equal to that at λs is given by
ν =
|α−β |2 at λs
|α−β |2 at λl =
1− cosθs
1− cosθl = 5.04, (2)
implying that a mean photon number µB→E ≈ 20 at λl would ensure a close-to-unity probability in the phase
readout11.
Decreased afterpulse probability
To quantify the decrease in the afterpulse probabilities in Bob’s detectors, we used the setup shown in Fig. 1. A
single THP was synchronized to the first in a series of detection gates11, 18 of Bob, and the times at which clicks
occurred in the onward gates were then recorded. The delay of the THP relative to the first gate was adjusted such
that the pulses going through Bob’s long arm hit the detectors just a few nanoseconds after the gate was applied by
Bob. Although we did utilize a polarization controller, only a maximum of ∼ 45% of the incoming optical power
at λl could be routed through the long arm. The remaining light, after having suffered propagation losses through
the short arm, hit D0 and D1 around 50 ns before the first gate (propagation time through the short arm is ≈ 50 ns
faster than the long arm in Clavis217). These light pulses before the gate were found to be the dominant cause for
increased noise in the detectors.
Figure 3 shows the time distribution of counts recorded in detector D0 at the wavelengths λs and λl . Each of the
histograms was prepared by recording 106 counts. To make the most of the limited number of histogram bins in the
counter (SR620), each bin was 0.4 µs wide and included counts from two consecutive gates. This allowed us to
cover a time range of > 80 µs. THPs with mean photon numbers µs = 2.68×104 and µl = 8.32×107 were used for
wavelengths λs and λl respectively. Despite µs µl , the data acquisition for the latter took much longer, indicating
that most of the clicks were actually (thermal) dark counts. The number of counts per bin settled down at a constant
value, representing dark counts, after ∼ 40 µs (right half of the histogram). The total number of thermal dark counts
collected could then be calculated by multiplying this value by the total number of bins in the entire histogram. All
remaining counts could then be attributed to afterpulsing. Table 2 lists these counts at the two wavelengths. The
afterpulse counts (ApC) make the bulk of the counts at λs, while dark counts (DC) are in the majority at λl .
It can also be observed in Fig. 3 that afterpulsing decay profile at both wavelengths is roughly similar, however
the ratio of longer to shorter lifetime components is slightly larger at λl . Although this would help our modeled
attack11, for simplicity we have conservatively assumed that the decay parameters at λl are the same as at λs18, 21,
aside from different overall afterpulse probability.
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Figure 3. Afterpulse profiles at λs = 1536 nm and λl = 1924 nm. Note that the histograms are rescaled such that
their peak counts and dark count rates match in the plot, making visual comparison of decay curves easy. The decay
curves are similar but not identical. A total of 106 counts were histogrammed at each wavelength. The originally
collected histogram data exhibited a saturation effect, in which count rate in later bins was slightly suppressed (by
6.4% for λs, 1.0% for λl) because of significant click probability in early bins. This has been corrected in the plotted
histograms, increasing their total count number above 106.
Table 2. Counts due to thermal dark noise (DC) and afterpulsing (ApC), extracted from Fig. 3 and corrected for the
saturation effect. (ApC+DC) is greater than 106 owing to this correction.
λ (nm) µ ApC DC
1536 2.68×104 867760 162854
1924 8.32×107 44981 962140
To compute a numerical factor γ that compares the afterpulsing noise induced at the two wavelengths, we first
take the ratio (ApC/DC) at each wavelength. Then, assuming the dark count probability per detector gate stayed
constant between the two measurements, we take a ratio of these ratios. We assume a linear scaling of the afterpulse
probability with the energy of the THP, and further normalise for the dissimilar mean photon numbers µs and µl of
the THPs. The numerical factor is then
γ =
µs
µl
(ApCl/DCl)
(ApCs/DCs)
= 2.83×10−6. (3)
In other words, a photon at λl is only 2.83×10−6 times as likely to cause an afterpulse as a photon at λs.
Attack modeling and discussion
Relative to λs, an attack at λl can thus effectively decrease the afterpulsing probability in D0 by
δ0 = ρνγ = 1.03×10−2. (4)
The factor ρν = 3.65×103 combines the results discussed previously on the aspects of increased attenuation and
altered phase modulation, which required THPs injected into Bob at λl to be ρν times brighter than at λs to ensure
optimal attack performance.
To calculate the afterpulsing probability for D1, one must also consider different losses from Bob’s entrance to
detectors D0 and D1 for the two attack paths (via the long arm at λs and short arm at λl , as shown in Fig. 1). We
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minimised LX–Y(λl) by adjusting input polarisation at X, then measured losses between X and the detectors through
the short arm. LX–C–D1(λl) varied by a factor of 11 over the input polarization, while LX–D0(λl) unexpectedly was
independent of the input polarization. Using the measured loss values (listed in the last two rows in Table 1), we
calculate the effective decrease in the afterpulsing probability in D1
δ1 = δ0×10[LX–C–D1(λs)−LX–D0(λs)−LX–C–D1(λl)+LX–D0(λl)]/10
= 1.05×10−3. (5)
With afterpulsing amplitudes reduced by δ0 and δ1, we have repeated the simulation of the attack strategy
proposed in ref. 11. Let us first recap this strategy, in which Eve manipulates packets or ‘frames’13 of quantum
signals traveling from Alice to Bob in the quantum channel. For instance, she may simply block the quantum signals
for several contiguous time slots in a frame, thereby preventing any detection clicks (except those arising from dark
counts) in Bob over a certain period of time. Conversely, she could substitute the quantum channel with a low-loss
version to increase the detection probability in another group of slots. Such actions provide Eve some control over
when Bob’s SPDs enter deadtime22 inside the frame, which is used to increase the efficacy of her attack. This is
essentially done by attacking in bursts, i.e., probing the phase modulator by sending bright THPs in a group of slots,
thus making the SPDs enter deadtime as quickly as possible to let the afterpulses decay harmlessly and contribute
as little as possible to the QBER. By balancing the usage of the low-loss line and the number of slots blocked per
frame, Eve can also ensure that Bob does not notice any significant deviation of the observed detection rate (typically
averaged over a large number of frames).
A numerical simulation modeling the above attack strategy during the operation of the QKD protocol is used to
calculate Bob’s incurred QBER Q and Eve’s actual knowledge of the raw key IactE . This is performed for different
attack combinations, i.e., by varying the number of slots that are blocked or simply passed via the low-loss line (with
or without accompanying THPs). If for at least one combination, IactE exceeds the estimation I
est
E from the security
proof but Q< Qabort, the attack strategy is successful in breaching the security.
For an attack at λl , we have been able to find several such combinations for the given frame size of N f = 1075
slots and a quantum channel transmittance T = 0.25. For instance, in one such combination, a total of 433
slots out of N f are blocked by Eve. The remaining 642 slots pass from Alice to Bob via a low-loss line with
transmittance TLL = 0.5, and out of them only 334 slots — periodically distributed in 12 bursts of 28 slots each
inside the frame — are accompanied by THPs to read the modulation. With this attack combination, we were able
to obtain IactE = 0.515 > I
est
E = 0.506 (calculation based on Clavis2 parameters and the attack conditions
11) and
Q= 7.8% < Qabort ≈ 8% (empirically determined in ref. 23). We remark here that for a similar value of Q, the best
optimized attacks at λs could not even yield IactE ∼ 0.080. Furthermore, in contrast to the TLL = 0.9 used in ref. 11,
implementing the attack strategy with TLL = 0.5 here makes the attack closer to be feasible in practice.
Note that in the simulation, we have mixed measurement results from two samples of Clavis2 system. The optical
loss measurements at λl and the relative decrease in afterpulsing come from the system installed in Waterloo (Bob
module serial number 08020F130), while the decay parameters of trap levels in avalanche photodiodes measured
at λs come from the system in Erlangen (Bob module serial number 08008F130)21. We further note that the latter
figures vary significantly between D0 and D1, although the two avalanche photodiodes were of the same type and at
the same temperature18. Therefore our simulation only gives a rough indication of attack performance. Results of
the actual attack, if it is performed, will vary from sample to sample. However, also note that we have tested a single
long wavelength of 1924 nm; a different wavelength may well yield better attack performance. Finally, more recent
commercial systems deploy SPDs with much better efficiencies and afterpulsing characteristics and, as noted in
ref. 11, this benefits the eavesdropping strategy.
We expect homodyne detection at 1924 nm to be easy to implement by using p-i-n diodes with extended infrared
response24, 25. Based on the published specs, the latter should provide detection performance in our setting similar to
that demonstrated at 1550 nm11. Separating Eve from Bob by some distance of fiber does not degrade the attack
very fast; we have measured 7.5 dB/km loss at 1924 nm in a 16.5 cm diameter spool of Corning SMF-28e26 fiber.
The easiest countermeasure to protect the QKD system from this attack is to properly filter the light entering the
system20, 27. E.g., adding a narrow-pass filter at Bob’s entrance will force Eve to use the signal wavelength λs and
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reduce her attack performance to the original failure, provided poor detector afterpulsing properties are maintained
in production11. Another countermeasure would be to use a QKD protocol that does not require the receiver’s PM
settings to be secret, such as BB84 with decoy states3, 10, 28. However, protecting the source’s PM settings will still
be required in most QKD protocols27, 29.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we have shown that despite the increased attenuation and sub-optimal phase modulation experienced
around 1924 nm, the Trojan-horse attack performed at this wavelength has a very good chance of being invisible,
because the afterpulsing experienced by Bob’s detectors is extremely low. This attack is mostly implementable with
commercial off-the-shelf components. Therefore, an urgent need exists to incorporate effective countermeasures
into practical QKD systems to thwart such threats.
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